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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
I.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING
THE ASSETS OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS.
II.
WHETHER BECAUSE OF VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF
THE ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION OF
PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE.
III.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE
ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF REAL NEED.
IV.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN
THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED.
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into the marriage by the parties respectively. Respondent's
home was sold after several years (TR at 8-10) and the
proceeds of that sale were paid into a savings account
from which the parties eventually paid off the mortgage on
the Appellant's home in which the parties continued to live.
(TR at 10, 53).
Personalty acquired during the marriage included
motorcycles (TR at 19), automobiles (TR at 18), furnishings
for the home, and a large recreational boat. (TR at 20, 53)•
The values set for these items and the accounts held by the
respective parties are listed in the Court's Memorandum
Decision (See Addendum).
The parties are both employed and have base salaries.
Appellant's is $1540.00 gross every two weeks, while the
Respondent's is $992.00 gross per month. (TR at 105-106).
The home awarded to Respondent is fully paid for and
rent-free.

Appellant had lived in that home from December

of 1961 until the marriage in June of 1968. (TR at 87).
Thereafter the parties lived in Appellant's home but kept
and continued to make payments upon Respondent's home until
it was sold in late 1973 or early 1974. (TR at 89, 115).
Appellant did not initially request the divorce, and denies
Respondent's allegations of threats and cruelty. (TR at 83-84).
Respondent's 22 year-old son had been living with the parties
and was a source of irritation to Appellant. Respondent sided
with her son, and ultimately had appellant removed from the
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failed to fix a value upon an expensive collection of fine
china which the Appellant testified his wife had represented
to be worth a substantial sum. (TR at 21, 99).
The result of the Court's division of assets is that
the Respondent continues to reside, rent-free in the paid
for marital home, and enjoys a relatively uninterrupted
lifestyle and security. She is surround€>d by the furnishings
of the home, which were awarded primarily to her, and has
in addition to her wage income $250.00 per month in alimony
from the Appellant. Appellant, on the other hand, is forced
into a lifestyle dramatically removed from his former
estate. His living costs have doubled as a result of his
being put out of the home. His familiar belongings are
in Respondent's possession or have been given away, and his
assets depleted by attorney fees and mounting costs. Assets
awarded to him as profit-sharing programs and retirement
do not produce any income for the next five years, during
which time he must pay alimony to maintain his wife's lifestyle, and this in spite of there being no threat she will
become a public charge nor has need.

When his retirement

programs begin producing income, it will be meager in
comparison to his present capacity, and will be fully taxed,
while her assets are not unavailable to Respondent, and
have only a modest property tax on the home.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING THE
ASSETS OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS.
A. Value was improperly set for the Appellant's
properties and assets:
1. The Retirement fund was not susceptable to
valuation, as admitted by the court.
2. The more reliable evidence on the boat's value
and the preponderence of evidence on its value came from
the Appellant, and showed a substantially lower value
than allowed by the court.
3. There is no "ESOP" stock for which the court
found a value, and no evidence of such in the record.
4. No testimony on the record establishes the "value"
of the penney stocks as fixed by the court, and the only
evidence of value is speculative at best.
5. Values on "furnishings" in the home divided
between the parties are not founded upon the testimony
of either party, and are therefore speculative.
B. No value was assigned for Appellant's equity and
investments in the parties1 homes; nor was value assigned
for the Respondent's fine china collection or expensive
clothing.

No rebuttal is found in the record to the evidence
-7-

presented as to the value of this collection.
C. Awarding equal equity in the marital home was error.
1. Appellant had established an invested value
in the marital home prior to the marriage.
2. Appellant had equity in the Respondent's home
established after the marriage but before the sale of
Respondentf s home.
3. The court failed to find facts on the above
issues, and instead generalized its conclusions and
awarded the home to the Respondent after finding equal
equity in it.

II.
BECAUSE OF VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF THE
ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION OF
PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE.
A. Equitable treatment is required as a matter of
sound policy and practice.
1. It is generally accepted that the relief
granted in a divorce action is equitable in nature.
2. The policy of our law and equity is to provide
"a just and equitable adjustment of economic resources
so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a
happy and useful basis." (Citation omitted).
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3. In fashioning equitable property divisions in
a divorce proceeding, the court may take into consideration-all pertinent circumstances, encompassing all
assets of every nature possessed by the parties. The
essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit
or asset has accrued, and to that degree it is subject
to equitable distribution. (Citation omitted). However,
any division which does not place the parties in an
equitable relationship such that they may reconstruct
their lives on a more or less equal footing defeats
fairness. The plan which upholds one party's lifestyle
while burdening and defeating the other's is inequitable
per se.
(a) Our laws in modern times speak to the necessity
of treating the sexes equally.
(b) Equal treatment must mean balancing all aspects
of the division of assets, including some reasonable
estimation of the impact a particular division will
be likely to have on the lifestyles and means of
both parties. A mere split on an estimated dollar
balance fixed by the court without sufficient evidence
on the record will tend to create unequal results,
and is more likely to produce inequitable residual
effects.
(c) In the present case the court was concerned with

-9-

merely dividing equally the dollar amounts involved,
and did not address the question of whether such
division would work an inequitable result.
4. Because the court failed to properly weigh the
impact of its decision upon the parties, the result
was disparate in effect.
(a) The Respondent is given a protected lifestyle
with little or no readjustment necessary. She lives
without much change.
(b) The Appellant is dramatically impacted in his
lifestyle. Forced from the home he had occupied
years longer than the Respondent, he is left with
few furnishings of his own, dramatically increased
expenses, including continued forced contribution
to his former spouse.
(c) Appellant has a seriously limited estate, since
his retirement benefits do not come to him for
five years at least, and those benefits will not
survive the contingency of his death. His profit
shares are beyond his reach until retirement, at
which time they will be subject to full taxation.
(d) Respondent by contrast has immediate economic
benefit from the house she received, wholey paid
for and rent free. Her assets are unlikely to
reduce in value and are not so heavily burdened with
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tax consequences* In the event of her death, her
received assets are fully inheritable by her heirs,
who are not Appellant's.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE ABSENCE OF
A SHOWING OF REAL NEED.
A. The testimony and evidence at trial did not demonstrate
any actual or real need for alimony from the Appellant.
B. The award of alimony further exacerbates Appellant's
economic condition, and takes in the five years contemplated
some eleven thousand-plus dollars ($11,000.00) from the
Appellant to preserve Respondent's lifestyle while his own
is irretrievably and inequitably diminished. There is no
justification for this.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN THE ABSENCE
OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED.
A. The testimony at trial failed to establish the
reasonableness of the fees charged by Respondent's attorney.
B. The testimony and evidence at trial failed to demonstrate
need on the part of the Respondent. Her debts were few and
small. Her ongoing need for home improvements was undefined,
and her salary adequate to meet her reasonable needs, including fees,
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY VALUING THE ASSETS
OF THE PARTIES, BY VALUING SOME ASSETS WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE, WHILE FAILING TO VALUE OTHERS.
The Retirement Fund
Appellant had a retirement program at his place of work.
The Court below heard testimony from Ronald N. Roy at trialf
to the effect that he would place a value upon the fund
based upon what it would take to have an insurance company
produce $265.13 of present monthly income on a twenty-year
mortality basis. (TR at 75-76).

He admitted that this was

not the sum available to Appellant, but only what an insurer
would need at the present to produce the benefits above.
(TR at 77). The Court in its Memorandum Decision at paragraph
19 found that the retirement had vested, but that actual
value would depend upon the number of years the Appellant
would live following retirement. Since this was difficult
to determine as a contingency, the Court placed an arbitrary
value of $15,000.00 upon the fund, and awarded it to the
Appellant. (Memorandum Decision at Paragraph 19).
In examining the Witness Roy, Respondents attorney
made reference to a certain exhibit P-16, a booklet explaining
the retirement rights. (TR at 79). The exhibit was received,
and is part of the record here. At page 8 of the exhibit P-16
these words are found: "If you are not married or have been
married less than six months, you would be entitled to a
-12-

straight life benefit for your lifetime only."

At page

15 of exhibit P-16 these words are found: "What if I should
die- . .". and the answer is given: "If you receive a
lifetime only benefit, no further payments would be made
after your death."

Thus the Court below has fixed a value upon

an asset that is based upon the speculation that the
Appellant will live to collect itf and has awarded to the
Appellant an asset that cannot be inherited or of benefit
to his heirs.
The Boat
The parties owned a 26 foot 1978 Fiberform boat with
twin outboard engines. (TR at 123). Respondent's only
testimony regarding the value of this item was to the effect
that she had heard Appellant say on one occasion at an undesignated point in time, that an undesignated person would pay
twenty-thousand dollars for the boat, which was the original
pruchase price. (TR at 21). That was represented by
Respondent to be the price on the boat as a "trade-in." (Id.)
Appellant offered exhibits D-16 and 17 and testimony
as to the conversations he had had with boat dealers. Their
offers on the boat were in the $10,000.00 to $12,000.00
range (presumably wholesale also). (TR at 93). The exhibits
were admitted over Respondent's objections. (Id.)
The most reliable evidence on the record thus fixed the
value of the boat at considerably less than the $16,600.00
pulled out of the air by the trial Judge.
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"ESOP STOCK"
The Court created stock where there is none. At paragraph
17 of the Memorandum Decision, Judge Page awarded to the
Appellant "the ESOP stock" and valued it at $690.00, No
such stock exists on the record, except for an unexplained
and cryptic reference in one of the Respondent's exhibits
to

something called "ESOP." (Exhibit P-8 or 9, Trial

Exhibits. The page does not appear to be labeled but is
attached to the other exhibits /~P-9, See TR at 42_7 ) •
The awarding of a non-existent asset on the basis of
an unexDlained exhibit entry admitted only as illustrative
of the witness Respondent's testimony (TR at 43) is
itself illustrative of the Trial Court Judge's predilection
to simply add up assets and assign values to provide a
numerical format for splitting the blanket, without considering
the equitable impact or the evidence quantum.
Penney Stocks
The value of the Penney stocks was never established
by the laying of proper foundation or admission of evidence.
The only evidence presented was the Respondent's

(Plaintiff's)

Exhibit 6 which lists without reference values for these
stocks. (TR at 25 shows testimony of the Respondent to
the effect that these figures represent "the current quotes
as of Friday," but gave no reference point for that comment.).
The exhibit was admitted as illustrative of testimony only.
(TR at 26) .

-14-

Home Furnishings
Respondent testified that the value of the home furnishings
was that Bet forth on Exhibit P-5. (TR at 16), Exhibit P-9
also apparently sets forth the value Respondent placed upon
the furnishings, as $3575.00. (Addendum, P-9).
Appellant valued the furnishings at $5,000.00. (TR at
108, See also Exhibits D-6 & 7 ) .
The Trail Court fixed the value of furnishings at $3500.00.
{Memorandum Decision at paragraph 6.)

No appraisal was offered

of the assets, and no analysis offered of the estimated costs
or value on the furnishings. Hence, no basis existed for
the Court to fix the value of the furnishings as it did, there
being an equal weight of evidence as to the value.
The Homes
Appellant had equity in both his home and the Respondent's
home as a marital asset prior to its sale in 1974. (TR at 8-10,
53, 114-15).

However, the Court failed to fix any value for

Appellant's contributions toward the Respondent's home, and
also ignored the improvements Appellant had put into the
Appellant's home prior to the marriage. (TR at 114-15).

No

appreciated value was assigned to Appellant's home for the
six to seven years he had occupied it prior to the marriage,
although some $2000.00 in value was admitted to by Respondent's
counsel in his questioning,

(TR at 115). The Court below,

in essence, simply balanced the contribution of the Respondent
against the contributions of the Appellant without any effort

-15-

to s cifically address these equitable issues or find facts
from he record before it.
Cour

The record does not support the

conclusion.
jfefc China Collection
Agx&llant testified as to the admissions of the Respondent

regarding value of her fine china figurines. This is essentially
the sane sort of testimony, apparently, that the Court
relied upon in finding a value for the boat. However, in the
case of the China, the Court was not disposed to find any
value in the items, and remained silent on the subject. Valuing
this item would have made a substantial impact upon the division
of assets. (TR at 122-23).

If the Court can find a value

for the boat based upon the hazy admissions claimed by the
RespoRifent, and in spite of the detailed denial and evidence
offered on that point by the Appellant, why could it not
find a value for the China Collection, especially in the
absence of rebuttal testimony or evidence on the subject?

II.
BECAUSE OF THE VALUATION PROBLEMS AND THE BASIC NATURE OF
THE ASSETS AWARDED TO THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, THE DIVISION
OF PROPERTY WAS INEQUITABLE,
A. Equity means balancing the awards to prevent placing
the parties in unecessarily burdened lifestyles or positions.
It is generally accepted that the relief granted in a
divorce action is equitable in nature. The policy of our
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system is to provide "a just and equitable adjustment of
economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis,11 Searle v. Searle,
522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); Barrett v. Barrett, 403 P.2d
649, 17 Utah 2d 1 (1965). See also Read v. Read, 594 P.2d
871, 872-73 (Utah 1979)
In fashioning equitable property divisions in a divorce
proceeding, the Court may take into consideration all
pertinent circumstances, encompassing all assets of every
nature possessed by the parties. The essential criterion is
whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued, and to
that degree it is subject to equitable distribution.
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) (setting inter
alia a standard for division of assets which are difficult
to assign a present value to, e.g. retirement funds).
However, any division which does not place the parties
in an equitable relationship such that they may reconstruct
their lives on a more or less equal footing defeats fairness.
The plan which upholds one partu's lifestyle while burdening
and defeating the other's is inequitable per se.
B. To achieve equity, all aspects of the impact of a
division should be examined.
Equality of treatment

is to a large degree the basis

of equity, tempered by the requirements of justice. In the
tradition of our case law, the standard has been to balance
all aspects of a case, and not merely split on a percentage
the dollar totals.
-17-

Our laws in modern times speak to the equality before
the law of the sexes. (See for example: Utah Code Annotated,
sections 11-25-12 (residential financing to be unbiased);
34-35-6 (Antidiscrimination A c t ) ; 13-7-1 (Civil Rights Act).).
This has manifested itself in courts of equity as a
general principle that all aspects of the case be balanced
and considered to avoid disparate results. Where the lower
courts have made unequal but equitable divisions of
property they have been upheld on the principle that balance
of equities sometimes requires such results. Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (Award of 77% of assets
to wife based upon her greater productivity during the
marriage); Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982)
(a 40-60% split upheld where no alimony was awarded and other
factor impacted the result).
However, when the courts fail to make a full consideration
of the results to be achieved, and are concerned, as is
evident in the present case, with merely dividing equally
as opposed to equitably the dollar amounts involved, the
result is a burden on one lifestyle and a blessing on the
other; an inequitable achievement.
It can be noted that the Respondent is given here a
protected lifestyle with little or no readjustment necessary.
She lives without much change in "her,! home, surrounded by
"her" furnishings and expensive china, driving a nice car,
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and receiving income from both her job, which appears secure,
and her savings, and the Appellant. He on the other hand is
dramatically impacted in his lifestyle. Forced from the
home he had occupied years longer than the Respondent, he
is left with little in the way of possessions and furnishings,
dramatically increased costs for housing and expenses,
including forced continued support of his former spouse
and indirectly through her of the twenty-three year old
step-son who was making no contribution to the home but
living there. (TR at 49).
Appellant has a seriously limited estate, since his retirement benefits do not come to him for five years and
will not survive the contingency of his death. His profit
shares are beyond his reach until retirement (TR at 126).
At retirement the shares and retirement are subject to full
taxation.
Respondent by contrast has immediate access to her
liquid

assets, and the items given to her are unlikely

to lessen in value over time. Except for the house tax,
her assets are not subject to the level of tax the Appellant
will pay on the future income as ordinary income. In the
event of Respondent's death, her estate will pass to and
benefit her heirs, which are not Appellant's. His estate
will be lost at death as to his retirement benefits.

-19-

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE ABSENCE
OF A SHOWING OF REAL NEED.
A. The testimony and evidence at trial did not demonstrate
any actual need for alimony from the Appellant. Respondent
showed the court her expenses, including $100.00 per month
for clothes, and $125.00 per month for incidentals. In spite
of Respondent's limited driving needs , she expends $230.00
per month on her automobile, and another $125.00 a month on
entertainments. Her utilities must be among the highest in
town, at $200.00 per month year around, and she lavishes
$100.00 per month or

.ome repairs. (See Exhibit P-8, Addendum).

Even given a short-term need to do some repairs to fix
a leak and a bathroom basin, she should live in style at
these rates.
Respondent's income is between $992.00 and $1100.00 gross
per month, depending upon whose testimony we accept. Her
home is paid for and rent-free. She has a son living at home
and he has steady income from a job. (TR at 49).
The award of alimony further exacerbates Appellant's
damaged economics, and takes in the five years contemplated
some eleven thousand dollars ($11,400.00) from the Appellant
to preserve Respondent's lifestyle while his own is diminished
dramatically. There is no justification for this.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN THE ABSENCE
OF A SHOWING OF REASONABLENESS AND REAL NEED.
A. Testimony at trial failed to address the reasonableness of the fees charged by Respondent's attorney.
"In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees must be
supported by evidence which shows that the requested
award is reasonable." Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah
1984) (Citing Delatore v. Delatore, Utah, 680 P.2d 27 (1984),
and Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P.2d 1380 (1980).).

Relevant

factors include the necessity of the number of hours claimed,
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty
of the case and the result, and rates commonly charged in
the community.

Id.. , Kerr v. Kerr, at 1384-85.

In the present case Respondent's attorney merely introduced an exhibit listing the hours spent and nature of the
activities filling those hours. It should be noted there is
never a phone call for less than .3 hours (18 minutes in
length) and that there was no proferred testimony addressing
reasonableness of the time spent or of the rates charged
in the community. No testimony was offered regarding the
difficulty of the case or justifying the amounts sought.
(TR at 80-81).
B. The evidence at trial failed to demonstrate need
on the Respondent's part for attorney fees. The Court awarded
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a mutual divorce, without greater or lesser blame. The
information previously offered in argument III. A.
shows that the Respondent was able to meet her own needs,
and this is particularly true if this tribunal upholds the
alimony awarded.

Respondent had no meaningful debts, and

is gainfully employed. She is capable of supporting herself,
having held responsible positions. (TR at 151) (Respondent
had worked for an airline, was considered an authority on
tax structures, and was in charge of a number of other
employees).
Were Respondent to appear before any court in this state
in need of counsel, what are the odds that a judge would
recognize her as having a need for counsel she could not
meet on her own with her resources?

CONCLUSIONS
By failing to value Appellant's interest in the home
sold by Respondent, and by failing to recognize any value
in the improvements and appreciation Appellant made to the
marital home prior to marriage, the trial court committed
discretionary error.

This error was compounded when because

of it the Court overvalued Respondent's contribution to
the marital home at payoff of the mortgage.
The trial court further erred when it failed to value
Respondent's China Collection, and undervalued the home
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furnishings awarded the parties. The evidence presented to
the Court below did not provide meaningful appraisals
or testimony as to value other than the unsupported opinions
of the Respondent and in some cases Appellant. Where support
was provided on the value of the boat, the trial judge
chose to ignore that support in favor of the unsupported
testimony of the Respondent, and made a value without basis
in fact or the marketplace.
The trial court also erred in finding a non-existent
stock and valuing it as "ESOP Stock." This resulted in
an inequitable distribution of value to the Respondent and
nothing to the Appellant to that extent.
Appellant's retirement fund was difficult to define
as a present asset, and the court fixed a value based
more on guesswork and hope than any fact before it. A standard
exists in our courts for fixing value on such accounts, as
set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, Supra. By treating this
asset as if it were a present asset rather than a future
possibility contingent upon work continuing and life remaining,
the trial court created a disparate result; for Respondent
ended up with assets having current value and use to
maintain her lifestyle, while Appellant is cast out to
await the possibility of future earnings with the tax man
at his elbow.
Finally, absent a meaningful showing of need from the
Respondent, and in the case of attorney fees, of reasonableness
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on the record, no alimony or attorney fees should have
been awarded.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant prays the Supreme Court Reverse and Remand as
follows:
1. Remand on the issue of the home value allocation,
requiring the Court below to assign value to the Appellant's
interest in the Respondent's home sold, and in the marital
home as appreciation and improvements.
2. Remand to determine the value based on appraisal of
the China Collection, Boat, and Furnishings, and reallocate
the property division accordingly.
3. Reverse as to the "ESOP Stock."
4. Reverse as to the retirement fund value and remand
to set a value as of the time of realization or a percentage
assessment as set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, Supra.
5. Reverse as to Alimony and attorney fees.
Dated this 14th day of March, 1985.

j
<db&bJ^
L
it
Bean & Smedley
Stephen A, Van Dyke, Esq,
Attorney for Appellant

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct set of
copies of the above Appellant's Brief this 14th day of March,
1985 to Respondents Counsel at 48 Post Office Place, Third
Floor, New York Bldg,, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage
prepaid, all as required bv law and the Appellate Rules of

-24-

ADDENDUM
Plaintiff/Respondent1s Exhibits at Trial . . .#5, 6, 7, 9, 18
Defendant/Appellant's Exhibits at Trial

. . .#1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 17

A portion of Exhibit P-16, Benefits Booklet
Memorandum Decision of 4 September, 1984
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Divorce Decree of 14 November, 1984
NOTE: Defendant/Appellant1s Exhibit D-3 at trial is here
denoted "Exhibit C" without change.

-25-

Furniture and Furnishings Purchased During Marriage
Color television - W
Living-room couch - W
Recliner chair - W
Living-room clock - W
Sewing Machine - W
Small curio cabinet - W
Gun cabinet - W
Globe - W
Bedroom hutch - W
Hide-a-way couch - W
Curio cabinet in living room - W
Kitchen hutch - W
Coffee table (basement) - W
Coffee table - W
End table - W
Small rocking chair - H
Remote control color television - W
Binoculars - H
Polaroid camera - W
Miscellaneous guns - H
Golf clubs - H
Microwave oven - W
Two-way radio - H
Yard Equipment - W

__^
I
I

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I

STOCK

Shares

Price per
Share

Tintic Mining

10,000

0.07

Classic Mining

3,000

0.10

300.00

Modern Minerals

1,000

0.10

100.00

Midnight Gold & Silver

2,000

0.125

25.00

50

.15

7.50

5,000

.02

100.00

40

.10

4.00

Name

Gyro
Stansbury
Airlift International
Totals

Value
$

700.00

$1 ,236.50

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

3HZ19

Plaintiff's Obligations
Creditor
Sears
Allman's Carpets
Total

Balance

Monthly
Payment

$

$

66.00
66.00

$ 132.00

20.00
25.00

$

45.00

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Plaintiff's Current Monthly Living Expenses
Real Property Taxes (residence)
Real Property Insurance (residence)

$

45.00
20.00

Maintenance (residence)

100.00

Food & Household Supplies

250.00

Utilities

200.00

Telephone

25.00

Laundry & Dry Cleaning

30.00

Clothing

100.00

Medical

25.00

Entertainment

125.00

Incidentals

125.00

Auto Expense

230.00

Installment Payments
Total

45.00
$1 ,320.00

Assets of the Parties
Home ($64,500 appraisal)
$2,500.00 equity to H
$6,600.00 reimbursed to W

$55,400.00

1980 Thunderbird

2,500.00

1982 Ford Pickup and Camper Shell

7,000.00

1971 Honda 90 Motorcycle

250.00

1975 Honda XL Motorcycle

400.00

Furniture & Furnishings

3,575.00

Utah Bank & Trust (checking) - H

6,395.06*

Utah Bank & Trust (savings) - J

20,445.84**

Tracy Collins (checking) - W

250.00

Boat - J

20,000.00

Stocks

1,236.50

IRA - First Interstate - W

9,250.02

IRA - United Bank - H (3 accounts)

7,114.58

Silver - 500 oz. ($6.00/oz.)

3,000.00

ESOP - H
31.422 shares ($22.00/share)

691.28

Portland Cement Profit Sharing - H
(as of July 31, 1984)
Merrill Lynch Share Builder
442.0598 shares
TOTAL

27,426.86
8,730.68
$173,665.82

$173,665.82 ; 2 = $86,832.91
Pension and Retirement - W
Grand Total

?
$

* As of December 7, 1983
** As of September 30, 1983 - Husband withdrew $6,000.00 on
Decmeber 21, 1983.

Division of Assets
Husband
Wife
$ 55,400.00

1982 Ford pickup

Home
1980 Thunderbird

2,500.00

1975 Honda XL

$ 7,000.00
400.00

250.00

Utah Bank & Trust
(checking)

6,395.06

Furniture &
Furnishings

3,075.00

Utah Bank & Trust
(savings)

20,445.84

Tracy Collins
(checking)

250.00

1971 Honda 90

20,000.00
Boat
1,236.50
Stocks

IRA - First Interstate
Sub-total
Cash
TOTAL

9,250.02
$" 70,725.07
+ 16,107.89
$ 86,832.91

7,114.58
IRA
3,000.00
Silver
Furniture & Furnishings

500.00
691.28

ESOP
Portland Cement profitsharing account
27,426.86
Merrill Lynch
Share Builder
Sub-total
TOTAL

8,730.68
$102,940.bu
- 16,107.89
86,832.91

A~A <;S00 00 per month in alimony.
Plaintiff to be awarded $500.00 p
*-n Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.UU
Defendant to be ordered to pay to Plaintiff
in attorney's fees.

to I

o
o
•
o
o

M
0)
<d|

CM

o
o

col
•P

8
0)
•
O
4J
<U

c

-H W
*W . p
C
M-l Q)
ui 0 E

*

3

>i
O
rH
— 'O
0
6
- H en
-P
fd 0
S-P

u
o cd
a en
e Mo
<D

u
o co

* p.,

-> t^

C O
- H -P
-p
CO <D

ox::*M-Hg
c w a) <D x: <u
O-H-H-PXC0

- .H

G
M
3
,^<4-4
>t
O *M
r H O
TJ

0
•H
CO
CO
<D
CO
D>
C
•H

*w M

C CO
0 CO C
O tn^W -P -P - H
O C 0
- H rH
•H
CO i 5 rQ

X
a

c

c d>

O co
> i S O
- H ^ ^ a) a) o
^ i O W H - H T3
fd 0) V4 T3 >
W J C (1) Q) O ^

>

—-^

a

••
a)
u
*—»
> i

-P
d)
M
O
d)

en
•

> i

-P

C ^
> -P <D CO
(DC
d) 0)
fd
-rlO
M «H «-B —
rH - H
—*
O P
«^ o w ^ *
(d
> , - p PU-P • * « E
d ) G d > G O O M
rH <2) Q d> -P
0

o
<D

d)
rH

13
•H

nd
d)

>
e
*—* en
*-'

-P
C
<D
•H
•H
O

c

0
•H
+J
fd

n
fd

CO

cd
•p

•^

-—H

a)
•H

e

M
0

m

a

•H

c

*

0
•H
.p
•H
CO
0

*

a

*

d)
TJ

*—'
4J

c

d)
•H
>-l
(gDOcf oi )- HH< W H ^ o Q)C
^
rH
fd
W - H g O O O
*>-H - H
2
C o
^
O ^
^
-^
4-> en£\ d> £\ 6 cod >
£ fd
)rH
* - H >
:*
-P
3 <*
o
<u M (d
C H
G - H C rH - - £
c fd
c
O fd -P 0 -P 0 J3
0
0
0
B O >i
•H
• H M • H d)
• H > £ - H 0 - H 0 -P - H
-p 0 - P r H
•P
.p
( D ^ Z + J M
C4J
rd * * H cd
(d Ou (U - H
fd *H fd TJ
fd
WffJrH W+J W
-HT3
CO
CO C co a>
M O O M M-4 M fcnrH T j
M
-H M 6
u
d)
<D en
a)
o
>
aid
0
c
o
id
> ^ 0 > ^ > - H \
O >
>
D*>
in
C C c O
O - H O +3
**-*
-P
OrH o
O £ C 0 O « » O - P t P
-P
V U
-P
C ^ H CD
M
0) ^ o <D
( D - H O O C O O - H O O <2> d)
C « H - P C a ) C 0 ) - P - H * « - H C
C <D C 4J
O U - P O - H O , O d > > M - l
O CO O 4J
X l \ I D X H £ . H <D 0 - H O X «P X W X d)

*
*
*

c

c
o

Of
•H
•HI

O
co
<D

4Jcoca>«H
o o fd o x

o
o
o\ •
•o
5TH

o

o
•
o
o
W

c
o
o

ao

a4^H?a4ocu>s«^op4c:D<(dP4rH

o

^3*
•

^oo
• •
rH

to
•

ro oo
• •

<D

on s f n

X

Pn

• fd
P<

•

ro
•

tn

CO
CO W

w

H

>*

>1
<D
H
•H
fd
EH

(D|

o

in

in o

o

O

fd

oo

fH

o o
00 00

CM r^ a \ o
f H rH rH <N

o
00

o o
00 00

CO
CM

^^

r- r* r^ r-. r»
o o o o o
— ^*>v^ N
«q« ^j» TJ« «Q»
00 00 00 00

oo

a

o oo

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/06/06
84/06/12
84/06/14

AR
AR
AR

84/06/15
84/06/20
84/06/25

AR

84/06/26
84/06/26
84/06/26

AR
AR

AR

TOTAL ATTY HRS
TOTAL COSTS
TOTAL PAYMENTS

Costs

Letter to client
Phone conversation w/client (boat)
Phone conversation w/client (appraisal); letter to
Lifferth; phone conversation w/Smedley (boat, home)
.7 Meeting w/client; letter to Smedley
Payment
2.5 Prepare for pre-trial; pre-trial hearing; trip to and
from Fatmington
.6 Memo to file; letters to Smedley & client
.3 Phone conversation w/client (prepare lists)
Arnold Richer/Mileage to Farmington

Payments

.3
.3
.5

5.2
8.00
210.00
********************

210.00

8.00

XAXlLlbl /

UUlXiMit

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/05/02
84/05/07
84/05/08
84/05/09

AR
AR
AR

84/05/11
84/05/16
84/05/18

AR
AR
AR

84/05/22

AR

84/05/29
TOTAL ATTY HRS
TOTAL COSTS
TOTAL PAYMENTS

Co

Photocopies (14)
1.2 Meeting w/client - Financial Declaration; review
1.8 Review file; drafting Financial Declaration
.3 Phone call to Judge Cornaby's Clerk; phone conversation
w/client (Herbal Life); phone conversation w/Smedley
.4 Revise Financial Declaration
.4 Meeting w/client - signing of Financial Declaration
.3 Phone conversations w/client (2); phone conversation
w/Mt. Bell (phone bill)
.5 Phone conference with Smedley; letter to client; letter
to Lifferth
Payment
4.9
2.80
400.00
********************

2
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MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/04/03
84/04/04
84/04/09
84/04/10
84/04/19

AR
AR
AR

84/04/24
84/04/30

AR
AR

TOTAL ATTY HRS
TOTAL COSTS

Costs

.3 Phone conversation w/Smedley
.3 Note to file
.3 Transmittal letter
Photocopies (7)
.4 Review Answers to Interrogatories, etc* from Smedley;
letter to client
Photocopies (45)
.3 Letter to client
1.6
10.40
********************

1.40
9.00

Payments

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/03/05
84/03/07
84/03/09
84/03/09
84/03/14
84/03/15

AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR

84/03/15
84/03/19

AR

TOTAL ATTY HRS
TOTAL COSTS

Co

.3
.3
.7
.5
.4
.5

Letter to client
Phone conversation w/client (H's records/bank accounts)
Meeting w/client (answers to Interrogatories)
Draft answers to Interrogatories
Phone conversation w/client; revise Answers to Interrogs
Phone conversation w/client; revise Answers to Interrogatories; letter to Smedley
10
Photocopies (50)
.3 Meeting w/client - sign Answers to Interrogatories
3.0
10.00
********************

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/02/13
84/02/16

AR
AR

TOTAL ATTY HRS

,3
,3

Costs

Phone conversation w/Smedley & w/client
Phone conversation w/Smedley & w/client
0.6
********************

Payments

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

84/01/04
84/01/04
84/01/09
84/01/09
84/01/24

AR
AR
AR

TOTAL ATTY HR$
TOTAL COSTS

Costs

1.0 Letter to client; draft Reply/interrogatories/Requests
Photocopies (ID
.3 Review documents; photocopying
Photocopies (60)
3 Meeting w/client (bank transfer, etc)
1.6
14.20
********************

2.20
12.00

Payments

MATTER
v. Talley
Date

Atty Description

83/12/07
83/12/08
83/12/09
83/12/13
83/12/14
83/12/14
83/12/14
83/12/14
83/12/15
83/12/15
83/12/15
83/12/15
83/12/16
83/12/19
83/12/19
83/12/20
83/12/20
83/12/22
83/12/22
83/12/23
83/12/27
83/12/27
83/12/30

AR

TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL

AR
AR
RD
AR
RD
AR
SD
AR
AR
FP
SD
SD
SD
SD

ATTY HRS
CLK HRS
COSTS
PAYMENTS

Costs

1.4 Initial consultation
Payment
1.2 Draft Summons/Complaint/TRO/Motion/Affidavit
.4 Review £ revise documents
Davis County Clerk/Filing Fee/Complaint/OTSC
Richard Dibblee/Mileage to Farmington
2.5 File Complaint & TRO in Davis County
Photocopies (60)
.3 Phone to Sindt (special run); organize documents
Davis County Clerk/Copies
Richard Dibblee/Mileage to Farmington
1.0 Obtain 5 certified copies of TRO in Davis County
.3 Meeting w/client (intro to PHL & SAD)
.3 Telephone conversation w/Donna re service of TRO
John Sindt/Service & Special Run/Summons, Complaint & OTSC
.5 Phone w/client & Smedley (TRO); discuss w/SD; note
.3 Phone conversation w/client (carpet/call H's daughter)
.3 * Filing %
.3 Telephone call to Stan Smedley
.6 Telephone conversation w/client; review file
4.0 Review file; prepare for OTSC; appear at OTSC
Sharon Donovan/Mileage to Farmington
.8 Dictate Order; letter to Stan Smedley
10.4
3.8
136.00
1,000.00
********************

57.00
6 .00
12 .00
10.00
6.00

39.00

6.00

EXHIBIT A
RESIDENCE ANALYSIS
Date of Purchase:

Dec. 1961

Purchase Price:

$17,375.00

by Glenn Talley, sole

3,160.00

Capital Improvements:
Parties Marriage:

June 1968 - 7 1/2 yrs after
purchase

Current Appraised Values

$64,500.00

$64,500.00
20,535.00
$43,965.00

Current Value
Basis of cost of Defendant
Increased Value 1961 - 1984
22 Years @ $1,998.41 year

Defendant's Equity in Home as of Parties Marriage
$20,535.00
Cost basis
14,988.00
7 1/2 @ $1,998.41 yr.
Dec. 1961 - June 1968
$35,523.00
Value as of Parties Marriage
Division of Equity between Parties
$64,500.00
35,523.00
$29,000.00

Appraised Value
Value as of Parties Marriage
Marital Equity divided by 2 = $14,500.00 each

Plaintiff's Entitlement

Defendant's Entitlement

$14,500.00
4,950.00 Plaintiff's Equity from
$19,450.00 sale of Personal Residence

$35,500.00
14,500.00
$50,000.00
-4,950.00 Plaintiff's
$45,050.00 contribution
from sale of
residence

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT B
ASSETS
Item Purchased
Home - December 1961

Value
$64,500

H H G &F

6,000*

Utah Bank & Trust Checking

2,000*

Defendant's Personal Checking
Utah Bank & Trust Saving

100*
15,000*

1980 Thunderbird Auto

4,675*

1982 Ford PU

7,137*

1971 Honda 90 Cycle

250*

1975 Honda 250 Cycle

400*

Lone Star Stock

8,730*

Lone Star Retirement
Profit Sharing

27,000

Classic Mining Stock

000

Tintic Mining Stock

600*

IRA Account Plaintiff

9,250*

IRA Account Defendant

7,114*

Boat

11,500*

Silver

3,700*

Tax Reserve

2,000*

Belleck China Collection

2,500*

Meat - Frozen Food Storage

1,000*

Plaintiff's Jewelry and Clothing

5,000*

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT C
ANALYSIS OF MARITAL ASSETS TO PLAINTIFF
Assets of Exhibit B

$87,000

Divide 50/50
Plaintiff's Marital Equity in Home (Exhibit )
TOTAL

$43,500
19,500
$63,000

Deduct:
Boat damage
BALANCE

500
$62,500

Defendant's Assets at Time of Marriage
A)

Savings

B)

1965 Mercury Automobile

$ 1,632
1,800

EXHIBIT D
INCOME
Defendant
Lone Star Industries
Base Pay - 1st and 15th

$1,540

Gross Pay

$1,733

Net Pay 8/15/84

$1,009

Base Pay per Month

$3,080

Net Pay per Month

$2,018

Plaintiff
Forester Concrete
Base Pay - Every two weeks

$ 553

Net Pay

$

Base Pay per Month

$1,198

Net Pay per Month

$

440

953

Defendant's exhibit 4
At trial

"MARINE SPECIALISTS"

PHONE (801) 534-1111
1045 SOUTH MAIN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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When may I rotire?_
Normal Retirement
Your normal retirement age is 65. You may retire and begin receiving benefits if you are 65 years old and
have 5 or more years of Eligibility Service.
Early Retirement
If you want to retire before age 65 and you are between 55 and 65 years old with at least 10 years of
Continuous Service, you may do so by filing the necessary application forms.
Late Retirement
If you do reach your normal retirement date, and if requested by the Company and it is agreeable to you,
you may continue to work for a period of one year or less. At the end of this period, additional periods
may be extended with the approval of the Company.
Disability Retirement
Regardless of your age, if you become totally and permanently disabled after at least one year of continuous service; if you qualify for a Social Security disability benefit and if you remain disabled for six
consecutive months, you may apply for disability retirement.

How much
will my pension he n I retire at ape 85?
Your pension payments are determined by a formula that multiplies a percentage of your Final Average
Salary by your Credited Service and then subtracts a portion — never to exceed 50% — of your Primary
Social Security Benefit.
If you are not married or have been n ^ r n ^ M »^ ?»
benefit for your lifetime only.

*

n

<^

yr.u would be entitled to a straight life

To determine your annua! retirement benefit;
(a) Take 1,75% of your Final Average Salary
(b) Multiply (a) by your Credited Service, up to 35 years
(c) Take 1.5% of your Primary Social Security Benefit
(d) Multiply (c) by your Credited Service, up to33Vb years
(e) Deduct (d) from (b)
Finally..,
(f) Multiply $174.00 (this is $14,50 a month) by your total period of Credited Service.
The larger of (e) or (f) is your Company Pension at age 65, payable for your lifetime.

•jl/hat if I leave tha Company before I re 45 re?
If you leave the Company after becoming vested, that is, after you have completed at least 10 years of
Eligibility Service, you are entitled to a monthly benefit starting at age 65. In addition, if you have completed at least 10 years of Continuous Service, you may elect to have your monthly payments begin as
early as age 55 at a reduced amount. The reduction would be actuarially calculated for each month you
are under age 65 when you start receiving benefits.
If you have less than 10 years of Eligibility Service when you leave the Company, you will not receive any
benefits from the Plan (unless you qualify for a normal retirement or disability retirement benefit).

What if I become disabled?
If you have at least one year of Continuous Service, become totally and permanently disabled and qualify
for a Social Security disability benefit, you will be entitled to a benefit of 50% of your annual salary as of
the date you became disabled, less 64% of your Primary Social Security Disability Benefit. Your disability benefit will commence six months after you have become totally and permanently disabled.
If you are still disabled at age 65, your benefits thereafter will be no more than what you would have
received if you had retired with a normal pension, computed as if you worked during the entire period of
your disability.
14

You may also select a reduced benefit that, in the event of your death, will provide your spouse with a
monthly income during her lifetime.

What if! should die. . .
After my benefit commences?
If you receive a lifetime only benefit, no further payments would be made after your death. If you receive
a joint and one-half survivor benefit, after your death, your surviving spouse would automatically get a
benefit that is one-half of your retirement pension for the rest of your spouse's lifetime (or 100% of your
retirement pension if you have retired at or after your normal retirement date having elected the 100%
joint and survivor benefit or any other option elected prior to retirement as provided by the Plan).
Before I retire?
The Company provides basic benefit protection through the Group Insurance Plan. In addition, if you die
after attaining age 50 but before age 65 and after completing at least 10 years of Continuous Service,
your spouse will be entitled to a lifetime benefit under the Retirement Plan. Your spouse's benefit will
be 70% of the benefit that would have been paid to you if you had retired early the day before your death,
assuming you had elected a 100% option the day before you died.
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This matter can a before the Court f^r hearing on the ilzh
of August, 11? S: 4.
Paul Liapis.
Smedley.

Plaintiff va s present and represented rv attorney

Defendant was p:-s^nt an 1 represented by Stanley *-

The C O L : : n-uru the testimony of tha vitnesses

evidence profered by the parties and beirq fully sdv:--^1

p r e m i s e s ma : e s : t s i r?^:;: lancum L/ecision a s :
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nh.e n a r t i e s sn o u
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i decree of
become final

upon entry.
3.

Th.it the Court

. e i end ant had i n

the home at ehe time of -_he marriage was approximately equal to the
amount r.- .;;->. subsequently contributed
fore that the parties have equal
f- ,'•}

;-f r - -

o

-\ "

*n .:i

»~. -J > * •*- -, .ci t

\ i^

v

>^ tre plaintiff and there-

"*

^

CL

r, -^r~ .^

s awarded ro "he olaintiff free

and clear of any claim cf the defendant and ~ .•>:• Court values the
home at 3 6 o, -J 0') , 0 1.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded the vehicle in her possession and the

Honda 90 ari toe Coure finds that they are wcrtn 34, 2~0,00 and $250,30
respectively.
6.

^ a i n t i f f is awarded the furniture and fixtures in the home

with the exception of those items listed

in Defendant's exhibit: 7,

MEMORANDUM DECISION, :" - J~ 2
Talley vs. Talley
excluding therefrom the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader which
is awarded to the plaintiff.

The Court finds the items awarded

to the plaintiff have a value of approximately $3,000.00 and those
awarded to the defendant approximately $500.00.
7. Each of rhe ponies are awarded their personal proper ty
and possessions and defendant is awarded his sports equipment.
8. That the piL:^~iff is awarded the food storage and freezer
items and Cr-urr values them at approximately $600.00.
9.

Ctjvr -awards to the defendant the truck and Honda 250,

having a value
10.

jf approximately $6,550.00 and $400.00 respectively.

Defendant is to be awarded the 1978 Fiberform boat, to-

gether with accessories ^ni the Court finds that, the value thereof
i s approximately $16f 6 0 C.0 C.
11.

That defendant, is

awarded those items of furniture and

miscellaneous proeprty listed in defendant's exhibit 7 with the
exception of the lawn Viewer end the fertilizer spreader which is
awarded to the p1a int iff.
12. That the defendant is awarded the parties interest in the
Portland Cement Profit Sharing valued at 327,196.00 -nd in the Lone
Star stock, valued at $8,700.00.
13.

Each of the parties is awarded their IRA accounts.

14.

Defendant is awarded the penny stock worth approximately

$1,236.00.
15.

Court finds that the retirement of the defendant is vested

and that the actual value is difficult to determine because it is
contingent upon the number of years that defendant would live following retirement.

For that reason Court values it at 515,0^0.00 and

awards any interest therein to the defendant.
16. The Coin t awards the silver to the defendant and values it
at $3,000.00.
1 7.

That the defendant is awarded the ESOP stock and Court

values it a t $690.00.
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18.

The Court awards to the plaintiff no interest in the
!

defendant s life insurance.
19.

As to the savings accounts of the parties Court finds

that $2,000.00 of that amount consists of tax reserve and awardes
the same to the defendant.

The Court finds that approximately

$4,000.00 was used to purchase the silver and that, silver now '.as
a value of $3,000.00 which has h-on awarded to t-he nefendan:. The
balance of $14,000.00 from cavils is awarded ?S,?50.03 t-> -he
plaintiff and $5,250.00 to : he defendant which brings "he amount
awarded to the parties as e.-u il as the C: ir: :~ ablir to 3:* witn
the circumstances.
20.

Plaintiff Is ordered to assume and discharge the debt

to Sears and to Allmans and any other debt which she has Incurred.
since the date of separation and to hold defendant harmless thereon.
21.

That defendant Is ordered to assume and discharge any

debt which he has incurred since the date of separation and to hold
the plaintiff harmless thereon.
22.

Defendant is ordered to pay :o the plaintiff the su:? :f

$250.00 per month as and for alimony f^r a perloi ; f two :".j,r:.
after which said alimony is reduced to the amount c: S17C. -0

r

r

month, said alimony to terminate at tne end ,.f ~ai~; itve / a.*
period or upon plaintiff's remarriage :u: "3 provide! :-y " w, wnich
eve r occur s f ir s t.
23.

Each of the parties is awarded any sums in their respective

checking accounts.
24.

Each of the parties is awarded the furniture ar/i fixtures

that they brought into the marriage with the exception o: ohe sterns
which have been given t :> the children previously.
25.

Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, for the use

and benefit of her attorney, the sum of $1,500.00.
26.

Plaintiffs ittcraey Is ordered to draft the Findings and

Decree and subin.it to ;ppcs ing counsel for approva 1 before for wa rdi ng
to * ^e Court for sig n ^ ^ —->.

/ts
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DATED-this 4th day of September, 19 84.

? o
RODNEY
Distri cb-^oux t Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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mailed a copy of the Memorandum Decision \ .1 Paul P. Li apis,
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Place, New York Life Bldg,

Salt Lake City, Utah- S4IQI a\i *. :> Stanley M. Smedley, attorney
for the defendant, 1 -'« South Fern Lar.e

f

Zayton, Utah, 340-1,

postage pre paid.
MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN, Clerk of Court
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A TRUE ^ 0 FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OA fill. IN MY CF\FiCB^S SUCH CLERK.
WITNESS MY ri^hb SEAL CF SAID OFFICE

THIsiiDAY^ ^fPfflA^As

19_^>

M I C H A E L G. A L L P H l i ^ C L E R K

BY

y^yA/kw.

(^at^iLA

HLEO |.V CLERK'S '*?»«DAVIS
cmrHiff^
PAUL H. LI-APIS - 1956
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4101
Telephone: 532-6996
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo—•
DONNA S. TALLEY,
p] a i nt I f f ,

F I N D I N G S

0 F

F A C T

A N D

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
v.
GLEN S. TALLEY,

Civil No. 34379

Defendant.
- -oo 0 oo- - • " • - - This matter having come on regular] y for trial on the 27th
day of August, 1934, before the Honorable Rodney .

rage, one of

the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her attorney, Pai 1] H

I i api s , ai id

D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r i n g in p e r s o n and by a n d through h i s attorney/
Stanley M. S m e d l e y f a n d t h e p a r t i e s a n d other w i t n e s s e s h a v i n g
b e e n d u ] y s "Vi :> r i i a n d e x a m i n e d u i 1 d e r o a 11 11 a i 1 d d o c i i m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e
having been marked and received by the Court/ and more than three
13) months having elapsed since the fili ng of plaintiff's
Complaint, ai id t h e C o u r t having heard the arguments of counsel
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal

sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised
in the premises, does now make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Davis

County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately
prior to the filing of the Complaint herein,
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having

been married on June 14, 1968, in Bountiful, Utah, and having
separated in December, 1983.
3.

Two children have been born as issue of this marriage,

namely, Kelly, now age 22, and Teresa Ann, now age 27.
4.

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that,
among other things, Defendant has constantly threatened Plaintiff
and the children with violence, has caused numerous arguments
over small inconsequential matters, and has failed to meet the
needs of the Plaintiff as a woman, wife and mother, all of which
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by
Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this marriage to exist in name
only.
5.

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that,
among other things, Plaintiff's child from a prior marriage has
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caused inconvenience and annoyance to the Defendant, has refused
to leave the home after he has attained his age of majority, and
Plaintiff has put her children before the Defendant, all of which
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name
only.
6.

The Court finds from the testimony of Plaintiff and

Defendant that the parties have been separated for a long time
with no minor children, that all of the efforts at reconciliation
have failed, that there is no good or useful purpose that would
be served in prolonging this marriage, and that a Decree of
Divorce should be entered and the same should become upon final
signing and entry.
7.

The Court finds that the parties, during the course of

their marriage, have acquired the following personal property:
1971 Honda motorcycle

$

250.00

1980 Thunderbird

4,200.00

Furniture, furnishings, fixtures
and appliances in the family home
and lawn mower and fertilizer spreader

3,000.00

Furniture items with the Defendant
and/or hereby awarded to Defendant
as per his Exhibit 7-D

500.00

Freezer and food storage

600.00

1982 Ford pickup and camper shell
1975 Honda XL motorcycle

6,550.00
400.00

1978 Fiberform boat, together with accessories
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16,600.00

Defendantus interest in his Portland Cement
profit sharing plan

27,196.00

Defendant's interest in Lone Star stock

8,700.00

First Interstate IRA (W)

9,250.02

United Bank IRA (H) (three accounts)

7,114.58

Penny stocks

1,236.00

Defendant's retirement account

15,000.00
3,000.00

500 ounces silver

690.00

ESOP stock plan
Utah Bank & Trust savings account

16,000.00

Tracy Collins checking account (W)

250.00

Utah Bank & Trust checking account (H)

200.00

8.

The Court further finds that the Defendant prior to

this marriage acquired a home located at 1163 South 350 West,
Bountiful, Utah.

The Court also finds that at the time Plaintiff

moved into the home, she contributed from proceeds received from
the sale of the home she owned prior to the marriage the sum of
$6,600.00 and that each party, therefore, owns an equal interest
in this home.

The Court further finds the home to be valued at

$65,000.00 by stipulation of the parties, with no mortgage or
encumbrance against the property.
9.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is presently

employed by Flower Aviation with a net income of $922.28 per
month.

4

10. -The Court finds from the testimony of Ashby S. Decker
that the Defendant is presently employed by Lone Star Industries
with a gross income through the 15th of Augustf 1984, of
$28,478.00.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has present

obligations outstanding to Sears in the sum of $66.00 and
Allman's Carpets in the sum of $66.00.

The Court finds that the

Defendant has indicated no outstanding debts and obligations.
12.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred attorney's

fees in connection with this matter.
13.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has no interest in

the Defendant's life insurance policies.
14.

With regard to the Defendant's retirement account, the

Court finds that said account is vested and that the actual value
is difficult to determine because it is contingent upon the
number of years that the Defendant would live on retirement.

The

Court further finds that the Plaintiff's actuarial expert, Ronald
N. Roy, has placed a value of said retirement account at
$30,040.93.

The Court finds the reasonable value of said account

to be $15,000.00.
15.

Specifically with regard to the $20,000.00 savings

account held by the parties with Tracy Collins Bank, the Court
finds that $2,000.00 of said amount consists of tax reserves
maintained by the Defendant.

The Court further finds that

approximately $4,000.00 of said account was used to purchase the
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500 ounces of silver, which the Court has valued above at
$3,000.00.
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of

additional support from the Defendant for a period of five (5)
years.
17.

The Court finds that each of the parties should be

awarded the furniture and fixtures which they brought into the
marriage, with the exception of those items which were given to
the children previously.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of

Divorce from each other upon the grounds of mental cruelty, with
said Decree to become final upon signing and entry.
3.

The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West

Bountiful, Utah, is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, DONNA S.
TALLEY, as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any
interest of the Defendant.
4.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of

$250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2) years, after
which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of $150.00 per
month for a period of three (3) additional years, with said
alimony then to cease at the termination of the five-year period
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or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, whichever
occurs first.
6.

Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property

the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell, the 1975 Honda XL
motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking account, the $7,250.00
from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust savings account (which
includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant for tax reserves), the
1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his IRA accounts, the 500
ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP plan, the Defendant's
Portland Cement profit sharing plan, Defendant's retirement
account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone Star stock plan, the
furniture in Defendant's possession defined as bedroom set, gun
cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun, 22 Browning rifle,
22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape recorder, binoculars,
Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain saw, battery charger,
3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill, vibrating sander, 2
coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue), suitcase, Toro 7-24
snow blower, car stands, new RCA television, couch which makes
into a bed, globe on stand, his sports equipment, the penny
stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining, Modern Minerals,
Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and Airlift
International, and his personal effects and belongings.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property

the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90 motorcycle, all the
remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances,
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including -the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader, the freezer and
food storage, her Tracy Collins checking account, her First
Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties1 Utah Bank &
Trust savings account, and her personal effects and belongings.
8.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay and hold the

Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The
accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets.
9.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay and hold the

Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him
since the date of separation up to the present time.
10.

The Defendant is hereby awarded all interest he holds

in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses.
14.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in

the sum of $1,500,00 for attorneyfs fees in this matter.
15.

The parties are each awarded the items of furniture and

fixtures which they brought into the marriage, with the exception
of those items which have been given away by the parties to their
children, and that position is ratified by the Court.
16.
documents

The parties are ordered to execute any and all
necessary

DATED this

to carry

forth

the intent of this

/4ft*day of 6e4ober, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

J l AH
)r DAVIS
)SS
NDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT
F DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY
HAT THc ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS
to FULL COPY OP. AN ORIGINAL DOCU-ILE \N M v O c F:CE A3 SUCH CLERK.
:SS MY H, ,ND SE/.L OF SAID OFFICE
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order.

APPFOVED AS TO FORM:

m
STANLEY My^SMEDLE^—~
Attorney/jor Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional
Center, 190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah
s *~ day of October, 1984.
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Third Floor, New York Building
— L'tFUTy CLtXrf
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
DONNA S. TALLEY,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
GLEN S. TALLEY,

Civil No. 34879

Defendant.
ooOoo
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 27th
day of August, 1984, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and
Defendant appearing in person and by and through his attorney,
Stanley M. Smedley, and the parties and other witnesses having
been duly sworn and examined under oath, and documentary evidence
having been marked and received by the Court, and more than three
(3) months having elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's
Complaint, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal
sufficiency of the evidence so incurred and being fully advised

in the premises, and the Court having made and entered herein its
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf and upon motion
of Paul H. Liapis of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys
for Plaintiff:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby

awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of
mental cruelty, and the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant
be and the same is hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby
free and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony and all
the obligations thereof, with said Decree to become final upon
signing and entry.
2.

The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West,

Bountiful, Utah, be and the same is hereby awarded to the
Plaintiff, DONNA S. TALLEY, as her sole and separate property,
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant.
3.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff

the sum of $250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2)
years, after which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of
$150.00 per month for a period of three (3) additional years,
with said alimony then to cease at the termination of the
five-year period or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by
law, whichever occurs first.
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Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell,
the 1975 Honda XL motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking
account, the $7,250.00 from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust
savings account (which includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant
for tax reserves), the 1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his
JRA accounts, the 500 ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP
plan, the Defendant's Portland Cement profit sharing plan,
Defendant's retirement account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone
Star stock plan, the furniture in Defendant's possession defined
as bedroom set, gun cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun,
22 Browning rifle, 22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape
recorder, binoculars, Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain
saw, battery charger, 3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill,
vibrating sander, 2 coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue),
suitcase, Toro 7-24 snow blower, car stands, new RCA television,
couch which makes into a bed, globe on stand, his sports
equipment, the penny stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining,
Modern Minerals, Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and
Airlift International, and his personal effects and belongings.
5.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90
motorcycle, all the remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures
and appliances, including the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader,
the freezer and food storagef her Tracy Collins checking account,
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her First-Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties' Utah
Bank & Trust savings account, and her personal effects and
belongings'.
6.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:

The

accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets.
7.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him
since the date of separation up to the present time.
8.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against the

Defendant in the the sum of $1,500.00 as attorney's fees.
9.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded all interest he

holds in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses.
10.

The parties be and they are each hereby awarded the

items of furniture and fixtures which they brought into the
marriage, with the exception of those items which have been given
away by the parties to their children, and that position is
ratified by the Court.
11.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

and perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein.
DATED this

JH^day of Oe^ofeer, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

JJ2

RODNEY SL^AGE
^~*
D i s t r i c t u o u r t Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
^

STANLEY M. SMBDLEY ^—^~~~
Attorney for/Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional Center, 190 South
Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah

84041, this J2£L day of

October, 1984.
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